

27 Feb 86

Halden, Pugmish, ERG:

1. How much input to Penn/Amsterdam
movement?

Papers, proposals, meetings, speakers?

2. What relation to: grass-roots?

media?

lobbying?

CO?

elections, candidates?

3. Why have I been so little aware
of proposals, analyses?

4. Why such a difference from Harvard stuff?

5. Why the strength of abstracts to proposals?
What is strategy for answering them?

6. Underlining of SU motives?

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Pagunash translates "neo-colonialism"  
into "competitiveness." (US-SU?)

Perhaps this is valid for the tendency  
of US intention to go nuclear  
[CSC help to rebels].

Does it describe real — US,  
shelarity — motives for intention?

(Fear of loss my figure; but  
immediate occasion is "rebellion," usually  
locally organized.)

Does Pag. adequately analyze US  
motives for intention — loss, fear  
of SU role, and for RU threat...



Pagnum (see 9th Report - INF, Dec 1957)

There have "no useful function etc..."

[ Rather: No other function whose potential usefulness outweighs its dangers & costs: its efforts on <sup>risk of nuclear escalation</sup> stability - war, its impact on SC progress and on proliferation

(Halden phrases this much better, like my formula above.)

If fail to identify function of

- D-L (as minimum)
- or beating up EU threats outside Europe; or freezing of such threats
- or cause of social econ. to Europe

here, to oppose those



Holden:

- Doesn't his com to a 1983 app  
to R's <sup>Feb</sup> 1986 show?

- Is it "superior" than R needs?  
Why did Drell dismiss this, at Soviet Univ?

[or "usable instability"?)

- Note: R policy rests on SO  
cooperation — essentially dissonant —  
to make it possible:

1) SDI (works "positively" only  
against a "nuclear-forever" FS

2) CF, US "superiority"

[Pike says, with SDI + CF,  
we could get a Temporary  
superiority]

[If goal is only, to make FS <sup>is efforts</sup> unstable,  
such a program would make second-strike  
even more unstable.